Three criteria in ethical reasoning Moral reasoning must be logical. The assumptions and premises, both factual and inferred, used to make judgments must be known and made explicit. The factual evidence cited to support a person's judgment must be accurate, relevant, and complete. Moral reasoning applies critical analysis to specific events to determine what is right or wrong, and what people should do in a particular situation.
Both philosophers and psychologists study moral reasoning. Some suggest that ethical action best protects and respects the moral rights of those affected. This approach is based on the belief that human beings have a dignity based on their human nature itself or on their ability to freely choose what they do with their lives. On the basis of that dignity, they have the right to be treated as ends in themselves and not simply as means to achieve other ends.
The list of moral rights, which includes the right to make your own decisions about what kind of life to lead, to be told the truth, to be free from harm, to a certain degree of privacy, etc., is the subject of extensive debate; some argue that non-humans also have rights. Rights are also often understood to entail duties, in particular, the duty to respect the rights and dignity of others. It is true that Hume presents himself, especially in the Treatise on Human Nature, as an incredulous in any specifically practical or moral reasoning. Therefore, while we are likely to believe that we approach ethical dilemmas logically and rationally, the truth is that our moral reasoning is often influenced by intuitive emotional reactions.
Given the designed function of Gert's list, it's natural that most of its morally relevant characteristics refer to the set of moral rules he espoused. If it were true that the lucid justification of one's own moral beliefs required considering them, ultimately, based on a priori principles, such as G. Alternatively, one could think that moral reasoning simply consists of applying the correct moral theory through ordinary modes of deductive and empirical reasoning. On the contrary, since moral reasoning has important implications for moral facts and moral theories, these close relationships lend additional interest to the subject of moral reasoning.
Possibly, these logically vague principles would be obfuscatory in the context of an attempt to reconstruct the fundamental truth conditions of moral statements. When a medical researcher who has observed a person's illness also points out that diverting resources to clinically care for that person would inhibit the progress of my research and, therefore, would harm the long-term health possibilities of those who suffer from it in the future, he is faced with contradictory moral considerations. This conclusion is reinforced by a second consideration, namely, that to the extent that a moral theory is faithful to the complexity of moral phenomena, it will contain many possibilities of conflicts between its own elements. From this, Kagan concludes that the reasoning of moral theorists must depend on some theory that helps us to anticipate and explain the ways in which factors will interact in various contexts.